Pricing bridges to cross a river. by Grigoriev, A et al.
Pricing Bridges to Cross a River ⋆
Alexander Grigoriev 1, Stan van Hoesel 1, Anton F. van der Kraaij 1,
Frits Spieksma 2, Marc Uetz 1, and Mustapha Bouhtou 3
1 Maastricht University, Quantitative Economics, P.O.Box 616,
NL–6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands
{a.grigoriev,s.vanhoesel,a.vanderkraaij,m.uetz}@ke.unimaas.nl
2 Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Applied Economics,
Naamsestraat 69, B–3000 Leuven, Belgium
Frits.Spieksma@econ.kuleuven.ac.be
3 France T´ el´ ecom R&D, 39-40 rue du G´ en´ eral Leclerc,
F–92131 Issy-Les-Moulineaux, France
mustapha.bouhtou@francetelecom.com
Abstract. We consider a Stackelberg pricing problem in directed, uncapacitated networks. Tariﬀs
have to be deﬁned by an operator, the leader, for a subset of m arcs, the tariﬀ arcs. Costs of all other
arcs are assumed to be given. There are n clients, the followers, that route their demand independent
of each other on paths with minimal total cost. The problem is to ﬁnd tariﬀs that maximize the
operator’s revenue. Motivated by problems in telecommunication networks, we consider a restricted
version of this problem, assuming that each client utilizes at most one of the operator’s tariﬀ
arcs. The problem is equivalent to pricing bridges that clients can use in order to cross a river.
We prove that this problem is APX-hard. Moreover, we show that uniform pricing yields both
an m–approximation, and a (1 + lnD)–approximation. Here, D is upper bounded by the total
demand of all clients. We furthermore discuss some polynomially solvable special cases, and present
a short computational study with instances from France T´ el´ ecom. In addition, we consider the
problem under the additional restriction that the operator must serve all clients. We prove that this
problem does not admit approximation algorithms with any reasonable performance guarantee,
unless NP = ZPP, and we prove the existence of an n–approximation algorithm.
1 Introduction
The general setup for the tariﬁcation problem that we study involves two non-cooperative groups, an
operator that sets tariﬀs, the leader of the Stackelberg game, and n clients that have to pay these tariﬀs,
the followers of the Stackelberg game. More precisely, we assume that a network is given, and a subset of
m arcs, the tariﬀ arcs, are owned by an operator. The operator can determine tariﬀs on these tariﬀ arcs,
while the costs for utilizing all other arcs are assumed to be given. Each client wishes to route a certain
demand on a path connecting two vertices. Such a path can in general involve one or several of the tariﬀ
arcs belonging to the operator, and we assume that each client selﬁshly selects a path with minimum
total cost to route his demand. Before the clients select their paths, the operator has to set the tariﬀs,
which he does in order to maximize total revenue. In order to avoid non-boundedness, we assume that
clients always have the alternative of routing on a path without using any of the operators arcs.
Notice that this problem is diﬀerent in two aspects from the network congestion problems studied
recently, e.g., by Roughgarden and Tardos [13], and Cole et al. [4,5]. First, we assume that there is no
congestion, hence the clients do not inﬂuence each other. They choose minimum cost paths to route their
demands, independent of each other. The Game Theoretic setting is only introduced by the fact that
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there exist an operator trying to maximize revenue using high tariﬀs, and the clients try to avoid high
tariﬀs by choosing minimal cost paths. Second, the pricing takes place before the users choose their paths,
so we are faced with a Stackelberg game, where the operator ﬁrst sets the tariﬀs, and then, subject to
these tariﬀs, the clients react selﬁshly.
2 Model
In order to clarify the relation to previous work, we ﬁrst formulate the general tariﬁcation problem, and
then discuss the restricted version considered in this paper.
An instance of the general tariﬁcation problem is a directed graph G = (N,A), where the arc set A is
partitioned into a set of m tariﬀ arcs T ⊆ A and a set of ﬁxed cost arcs F = A\T. There are n clients (or
commodities) k ∈ {1,...,n}, and each client k has a demand dk that has to be routed from source node
sk to target node tk. Because there is no congestion involved, we may assume without loss of generality
that all demand values dk are scaled to be integral. The tariﬀ for the utilization of any tariﬀ arc a ∈ T
must be determined by the operator; it is denoted by τa. The tariﬀ for the utilization of any ﬁxed cost arc
is assumed to be given for all ﬁxed cost arcs. The clients route their demands from source to destination
according to a path with minimal total cost, where the total per unit cost of a path is deﬁned as the sum of
the tariﬀs and ﬁxed costs on the arcs of the path. Whenever the client has a choice among multiple paths
with the same total cost but with diﬀerent revenues for the operator, we assume that the client takes the
path that is most proﬁtable to the operator. (This can always be achieved with arbitrary precision by
reducing tariﬀs by some small value ε.) We assume that an (sk,tk)-path exists consisting only of ﬁxed
cost arcs for every client k ∈ {1,...,n}, since the problem is otherwise unbounded. Without going into
further details, we mention that this problem is a classical Stackelberg game that can be modelled as a
linear bilevel program [11].
We next describe a simple transformation of the given graph G that allows one to restrict to very
speciﬁc graphs (although probably losing certain graph properties, such as planarity). When we replace
all shortest paths that only consist of ﬁxed cost arcs by direct arcs, and possibly introduce additional
dummy arcs with zero or inﬁnite cost, respectively, we obtain a shortest path graph model as described
by Bouhtou et al. [3]. After this transformation, we can assume that all tariﬀ arcs are pairwise disjoint,
and there exists a direct arc from the source node sk to the tail node of any tariﬀ arc a, and a direct
arc from the head node of any tariﬀ arc a to any target node tk. Moreover, there exists a ﬁxed cost arc
(sk,tk) for all clients k = 1,...,n, and the ﬁxed cost for that arc, which we denote by uk, represents the
cheapest possible (sk,tk)-path (in the original graph) without using any of the tariﬀ arcs. In other words,
uk represents the highest acceptable total per unit price for client k.
The additional assumption in the problem considered in this paper, to which we refer as the river
tariﬁcation problem (RTP), is the following: Independent of the tariﬀs, we assume that any client routes
her demand on a path that includes at most one tariﬀ arc. In Section 4, we discuss practical applications for
this model, motivated by problems in telecommunication networks. In the shortest path graph model, this
restriction is equivalent to the deletion of any backward-arc that might exist between head nodes of tariﬀ
arcs and tail nodes of other tariﬀ arcs. Figure 1 illustrates the shortest path graph model of an instance
of the river tariﬁcation problem with three tariﬀ arcs and two clients. The tariﬀ arcs ai,i ∈ {1,2,3} are
the dashed arcs in the network. We may also assume without loss of generality that all ﬁxed cost arcs
incident with the target nodes tk have zero cost, because otherwise we can just add their costs to the
ﬁxed cost arcs incident with source nodes sk. Therefore, let us denote by cka the cost of the arc that
connects customer k to tariﬀ arc a. The value uk −cka then represents client k’s highest acceptable tariﬀ
for utilizing tariﬀ arc a. It can as well be interpreted as client k’s valuation for tariﬀ arc a. Notice that the
only diﬀerence to the general tariﬁcation problem described previously is the non-existence of backward












Fig.1. River tariﬁcation problem with n = 2 and m = 3.
To summarize, the parameters that deﬁne an instance of a river tariﬁcation problem are the number
of tariﬀ arcs m, the number of clients n, their demand values dk, k ∈ {1,...,n}, and the costs for ﬁxed
cost arcs. We have cka as the cost of the ﬁxed cost arcs that connect customers k to tariﬀ arcs a, and uk
as the cost of arc (sk,tk), the highest acceptable cost for client k. Due to the fact that any path taken by
a client involves exactly one ﬁxed cost arc with non-zero cost, we may assume without loss of generality
that the costs cka of these ﬁxed cost arcs are integral. Moreover, due to the integrality of the costs of the
ﬁxed cost arcs, it is immediate that any reasonable solution will adopt only tariﬀs which are integral, too.
Notice that this might not be true for the general tariﬁcation problem, where a path chosen by a client
can consist of more than one tariﬀ arc.
3 Related work and results
A formulation of the general tariﬁcation problem is the linear bilevel program described by Labb´ e et al.
[11]. They show, among other things, that already the problem with a single client is strongly NP-hard,
given that also negative tariﬀs are allowed. Roch et al. [12] show that the single client problem remains
strongly NP-hard, even when restricted to nonnegative tariﬀs. In the same paper, a polynomial time
(1 + 1/2 lnm)–approximation algorithm is proposed for the problem with a single client, where m is the
number of tariﬀ arcs.
In contrast to these two papers, which mainly address the general tariﬁcation problem with a single
client, we consider the problem with multiple clients. However, as described above, we assume that each
client utilizes at most one tariﬀ arc, yielding an instance of the river tariﬁcation problem. In fact, this
problem can equivalently be interpreted as a pricing problem for multiple products, where the tariﬀ
arcs a ∈ T correspond to diﬀerent products, and each user k is interested in buying dk units of one
product. Since we consider uncapacitated networks, products are available in unlimited amount (e.g.,
bulk products). Whenever there is an arc between a client k and a tariﬀ arc a in the river tariﬁcation
problem, the interpretation is that client k is interested in buying product a. If she decides to buy product
a, she incurs a per unit shipment cost of cka, in addition to the per unit cost of τa for product a. The
ﬁxed cost uk of the ﬁxed cost arc (sk,tk) is simply interpreted as the maximum total (per unit) price a
client k is willing to pay to purchase any of the products. In other words, uk − cka represents client k’s
valuation for product a.
After this discussion, we can exhibit a close relation of the river tariﬁcation problem considered in this
paper to other papers that address multi-product pricing problems. Recently, two groups of researchers,
independently of each other, reported several results for such problems. Aggarwal et al. [1], among other
things, consider a multi-product pricing problem where any client k has diﬀerent budgets bka for diﬀerent4 A. Grigoriev et al.
products a, which are available in unlimited amount. The operator has to determine prices for the
products in order to maximize the total revenue, under the assumption that a client buys (one unit of)
the cheapest product among the products she can aﬀord. Aggarwal et al. [1] prove APX-hardness of
this problem, together with a (1 + lnn)-approximation algorithm. Notice that, despite of the obvious
similarities, the multi-product pricing problem is conceptually diﬀerent from the tariﬁcation problem
considered in this paper. In the river tariﬁcation problem, clients choose the product with minimum total
per unit cost, also taking into account the shipment costs cka, rather than the cheapest product among
all aﬀordable products.
Guruswani et al. [8] consider a proﬁt-maximizing envy-free pricing problem. Clients have diﬀerent
valuations for diﬀerent products, and each product is available in limited amount. The operator has to
determine prices for the products, and allocate the products to clients such that, again, total revenue is
maximized, and given the pricing, no client would prefer to be assigned a diﬀerent product. Here, the
clients measure their preferences in terms of the diﬀerence between their valuation and the purchase price.
If the price is higher than the clients’ valuation, then the client does not purchase the product. In fact,
the proﬁt-maximizing envy-free pricing problem with unlimited supply of products is equivalent to the
river tariﬁcation problem considered here. Guruswani et al. [8] independently prove APX-hardness of the
problem, and derive a (2lnn)-approximation algorithm for the case of unit demand of clients, and with
limited supply of products.
In this paper, we derive several results concerning complexity and approximability of the river tariﬁ-
cation problem. In Section 5.1, by a reduction from the Max-2-Sat-3 problem, we show that the river
tariﬁcation problem is APX-hard, even if each client is connected to at most two tariﬀ arcs. This result
coincides with the APX-hardness result of [8]; obtained independently. The quality of uniform tariﬁcation
policies, where all arcs are priced with the same tariﬀ, is analyzed in Section 5.2. The problem to ﬁnd an
optimal uniform tariﬀ is well-known to be solvable in polynomial time, even for the general tariﬁcation
problem [14]. We show that uniform tariﬁcation is an m–approximation, and this is tight. Using a simple
geometric argument, we also show that uniform tariﬁcation is a (1+lnD)–approximation, which is tight
up to a constant factor. Here, D is the total demand that is served by the operator in an optimal solu-
tion, which is upper bounded by the total demand. Hence, whenever the clients have unit demand, this
yields a (1 + lnn)–approximation. We empirically analyze the quality of uniform tariﬁcation policies in
Section 5.3, using instances from France T´ el´ ecom. Finally, we brieﬂy discuss some polynomially solvable
special cases of the river tariﬁcation problem in Section 5.4.
In Section 6, we consider another variant of the problem where the operator is not allowed to reject
any client. Notice that this might increase the total revenue, since some clients might exist that can only
be served at a low price, while others would be willing to pay much more. We show, by a reduction
from the Independent Set problem, that this problem does not allow approximation to within a factor
O(m1−ε) or O(n1/2−ε), unless ZPP = NP. (Recall that m is the number of tariﬀ arcs and n is the number
of clients.) On the positive side, we can show that the problem admits an n-approximation.
4 Applications
For a ﬁrst motivation, consider the internet. Whenever an autonomous system, represented by some
subnetwork, has to transit data, the data may enter and exit the autonomous system at diﬀerent points.
Clients have to pay a price for transmitting data through the autonomous system, yielding revenue for
its owner. The data ﬂow can be modelled such that once it is routed through the autonomous system,
it does not pass a second time. See Figure 2(a), where the clients have the choice between two diﬀerent
autonomous systems (AS1 and AS2), with two entry- and exit-points. This can be modelled as a river
tariﬁcation problem, introducing a tariﬀ arc for each entry-exit combination.Pricing Bridges to Cross a River 5
For another motivation, consider point-to-point markets, where a telecommunications operator is
oﬀering bandwidth capacity between two points A and B at a certain price. Other operators are active in
this market as well. Their prices for bandwidth capacity are known. Clients can choose between diﬀerent
levels of Quality of Service (QoS) from each operator, and clients have a preference for the QoS-levels.
We can model this problem as an instance of the river tariﬁcation problem, too. Figure 2(b) shows a
small example with two customers, represented by two commodities (s1,t1) and (s2,t2). The operator
has three QoS levels, represented by the subnetwork between the nodes qis and qit, where i ∈ {1,2,3}. In
this example, customer (s1,t1) is interested in two QoS levels, namely QoS1 and QoS2, whereas customer
(s2,t2) is interested in QoS2 and QoS3. The preference of each customer k with regard to each QoS
level is determined by the cost of the edge from the source sk to the node qis, i ∈ {1,2,3}, smaller cost
indicating a higher preference for the QoS level. The prices of other operators for the same QoS level is
given by the cost on the (ﬁxed cost) arcs (qis,qit), i ∈ {1,2,3}. The revenue for the operator for each























Fig.2. Applications of the river tariﬁcation problem.
Finally, the network topology of a river tariﬁcation problem may be assumed –possibly after the simple
transformation described previously– in telecommunication networks where it is known a priori that the
path of each client utilizes at most one tariﬀ arc. This occurs, e.g., in the international interconnections
market, where several operators oﬀer connections to a particular country. If we focus on the market for
one particular country, we can assume that it is not proﬁtable for any client to enter the country twice.
5 River Tariﬁcation: Complexity and Approximation
We ﬁrst show that the river tariﬁcation problem is APX-hard. Then, we derive bounds on the quality of
uniform tariﬁcation policies, where all tariﬀs are required to be identical. We present a short computational
study with instances from France T´ el´ ecom, and brieﬂy discuss some polynomially solvable special cases.
5.1 Complexity
Roch et al. [12] show that the general tariﬁcation problem is NP-hard in the strong sense, even when
restricted to a single client, using a reduction from the NP-complete problem 3-Sat [6]. Their reduction
works for tariﬁcation problems where paths are allowed to use (and indeed, must use) several tariﬀ6 A. Grigoriev et al.
arcs. We consider a reduction of Max-2-Sat-3. This is a variant of the Satisfiability problem [6]. An
instance of the Satisfiability problem is a boolean function f : {0,1}n → {0,1} on n variables x1, ...,
xn, in conjunctive normal form. Such a function f is the conjunction of m clauses Ck, f =
Vm
k=1 Ck, each
clause being the disjunction of one or several literals. Any literal represents either a variable xi, or its
negation ¯ xi, i ∈ {1,...,n}. Function f is called satisﬁable if there exists a truth assignment x1,..., xn
such that at least one literal per clause is true. In the 2-Sat problem, each clause Ck is the disjunction of
exactly 2 literals. In the 2-Sat-3 problem, in addition, each variable occurs at most 3 times in all literals.
The problem to ﬁnd a truth assignment that fulﬁlls the maximum number of clauses, Max-2-Sat-3, is
known to be APX-hard [2].
Theorem 1. The river tariﬁcation problem is APX-hard, even when each client is connected to at most
two tariﬀ arcs.



















Fig.3. Subnetwork for variable xi, i ∈ {1,...,n}.
{1,...,n} of the Max-2-Sat-3 instance, we construct a constant-size subnetwork as shown in Figure 3.
Each of these subnetworks has three clients with unit demand, with origin-destination pairs {sij,tij},
j ∈ {1,2,3}. Moreover, each subnetwork has two tariﬀ arcs, ai representing the truth assignment xi = 1,
and ¯ ai representing xi = 0.
An upper bound on the cost of routing commodities 1 and 3 is given by ﬁxed cost arcs (si1,ti1) and
(si3,ti3), both with cost 5. For commodity 2, the upper bound on the cost is given by a ﬁxed cost arc
(si2,ti2), with cost 3. We call this client the cheap client.
Next, for each clause Ck, k ∈ {1,...,m}, we create a clause-commodity k with origin destination
pairs {sk,tk}, with unit demand. Whenever a variable xi (¯ xi, respectively) appears as one of clause Ck’s
literals, we connect sk to si1 (si3, respectively), and ti1 (ti3, respectively) to tk, using arcs of zero cost. In
addition, we introduce a ﬁxed cost arc (sk,tk) with cost 3, deﬁning an upper bound of 3 for the cost of
routing clause-commodity k. The so-deﬁned instance of the river tariﬁcation problem has 2n tariﬀ arcs,
3n+m commodities (or clients), and at most 7m+11n ﬁxed cost arcs, hence the transformation is indeed
polynomial.
Let an instance of Max-2-Sat-3 be given, and denote by ΠSAT the maximum number of satisﬁable
clauses, and by ΠRTP denote the maximum revenue for the corresponding instance of the river tariﬁcation
problem. Moreover, we denote by s any feasible solution of Max-2-Sat-3, and we denote by S any feasible
solution for the river tariﬁcation problem.
In order to exhibit an approximation-preserving reduction, we need to establish the validity of two
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(i) there exists a constant α > 0 such that
ΠRTP ≤ αΠSAT ,
(ii) there exists a constant β > 0 such that for any feasible solution S of the river tariﬁcation problem,
there exists a solution s for Max-2-Sat-3 with
ΠRTP − ΠRTP
S ≥ β(ΠSAT − ΠSAT
s ).
First, we prove (i). The maximal revenue for each subnetwork is given by setting one of the tariﬀs to
3, and another one to 5, yielding a revenue of 5 + 2   3 = 11. In all other cases, the revenue is not more
than 10. Therefore, we have that ΠRTP ≤ 11n+3m. Since no more than two variables can be present in
a clause, m ≥ n/2. Notice that ΠSAT ≥ m/2 (just consider the best of the following two solutions: set
all variables to true, and set all variables to false). It follows that ΠRTP ≤ 50ΠSAT, hence (i) holds with
α = 50.
Now, we prove (ii). Given some solution S for the river tariﬁcation problem, we are going to build
another solution S′ for the river tariﬁcation problem such that ΠRTP
S′ ≥ ΠRTP
S . Next we associate to S′
a solution s for Max-2-Sat-3. Our goal is to build a solution S′ where the demand of each cheap client
is routed via one of the two tariﬀ arcs of the respective subnetwork.
First, we consider the subnetworks in which both tariﬀs are greater than 3. If both tariﬀs are greater
than 3 in a subnetwork, we set arbitrarily one to 5, the other one to 3, and we route the demand of the
cheap client via the arc with tariﬀ 3. Observe that this does not decrease the subnetwork’s contribution
to the value of the resulting solution. If we can route a not-yet-routed clause commodity through the
tariﬀ arc with tariﬀ 3, we do so.
Second, we consider the subnetworks in which one tariﬀ is greater than 3, and the other one is less
than or equal to 3. In that case, we set the higher tariﬀ to 5, and the smaller tariﬀ to 3. In case the
demand of the cheap client had not yet been routed, we route it via the tariﬀ arc with tariﬀ 3. Again, one
can verify that this does not decrease the subnetwork’s contribution to the value of the resulting solution.
If we can route a not-yet-routed clause commodity through the tariﬀ arc with tariﬀ 3, we again do so.
Finally, we consider the subnetworks in which both tariﬀs are less than or equal to 3. Let there
be p subnetworks of this type. These p subnetworks contribute to the value of the current solution at
most 9p + ℓ where ℓ is the number of clause commodities that are routed via a tariﬀ arc of one of the
p subnetworks. For these p subnetworks, let us consider two diﬀerent partial solutions. In one of these
partial solutions the demand of the cheap client is routed upwards at tariﬀ 3, the tariﬀ of the lower arc is
set to 5, and we simply disconnect all clause commodities that were previously routed via the lower arc
before. In the other partial solution, the demand of the cheap client is routed downwards at tariﬀ 3, the
tariﬀ of the upper arc is set to 5, and we simply disconnect all clause commodities that were previously
routed via the upper arc. Also, if we can route a not-yet-routed clause commodity through the tariﬀ arc
with tariﬀ 3, in both partial solutions, we do so.
We claim that at least one of these two partial solution has a contribution to the solution’s value
that is not less than the original contribution 9p + ℓ. Indeed, we now have 11p + ℓ/2 for at least one of
these two partial solutions, since each clause commodity had to go via an upper or a lower arc. Notice
that 11p + ℓ/2 ≥ 9p + ℓ holds if p ≥ ℓ/4. Since we are dealing with Max-2-Sat-3 where each variable
(subnetwork) is connected to at most 3 clauses, it follows that ℓ ≤ 3p, or p ≥ ℓ/3.
Now we have completed the construction of S′ and we have veriﬁed that ΠRTP
S′ ≥ ΠRTP
S . Notice
that in S′ the demand of each cheap client has been routed via a tariﬀ arc. This determines the truth
assignment of the corresponding variables in solution s of Max-2-Sat-3: We deﬁne the truth assignment
of s according to the utilized tariﬀ arcs of the cheap clients. Thus, the number of clause commodities
routed via a tariﬀ arc in S′ equals the number ΠSAT
s of satisﬁed clauses in the Max-2-Sat-3 solution s.8 A. Grigoriev et al.
Let us now ﬁnish the argument for (ii). We have that ΠRTP ≥ 11n + 3ΠSAT, since the optimal
solution for Max-2-Sat-3 yields a feasible solution for the river tariﬁcation problem where ΠSAT clause








s ), which ﬁnishes the proof with β = 3. ⊓ ⊔
Observe that, in a sense, we have delineated a borderline between easy and hard instances of the river
tariﬁcation problem, since if each client is connected to at most one arc the problem is trivial, while in
the described reduction each client is connected to at most two tariﬀ arcs. Hence, even for that case no
polynomial time approximation scheme can exist, unless P = NP.
5.2 The quality of uniform tariﬁcation policies
The uniform tariﬁcation problem (UTP) is the same as the general tariﬁcation problem, with the ad-
ditional restriction that all tariﬀs are required to be identical. As shown by van Hoesel et al. [14], the
uniform tariﬁcation problem can be solved in polynomial time, even in the general setting where clients
may use paths with several tariﬀ arcs. The algorithm described by van Hoesel et al. [14] uses the para-
metric shortest path algorithm of Young et al. [15] and Karp and Orlin [10] to determine the tariﬀ values
(i.e. breakpoints) for which the shortest path tree changes for any client. Calculating the revenue for the
operator at each breakpoint and maintaining the best solution yields the optimal uniform tariﬁcation
policy in polynomial time.
We next analyze the loss that can be experienced by adopting such a uniform tariﬁcation policy for
the river tariﬁcation problem. Therefore, denote by ΠUTP the revenue for an optimal uniform tariﬁcation,
and by ΠRTP the revenue for an optimal non-uniform tariﬁcation. By deﬁnition, ΠUTP ≤ ΠRTP.
Lemma 1. If an optimal tariﬁcation for the river tariﬁcation problem with revenue ΠRTP utilizes at
most r diﬀerent tariﬀs, then for the optimal uniform tariﬁcation, ΠUTP ≥ ΠRTP/r.
The proof of this lemma is indeed trivial. To this end, consider an optimal non-uniform tariﬁcation
with tariﬀs τ1 ≤     ≤ τm, and let Di be the total demand on an arc ai with tariﬀ τi, i ∈ {1,...,m}.
By D =
Pn
k=1 Dk we denote the total demand served by the operator. Then the revenue created by this
solution is the area under the following ‘staircase’ function f : [0,D] → [0,∞[, depicted in Figure 4.
f(x) = τi for all x with
X
j<i
Dj ≤ x <
X
j≤i
Dj , i ∈ {1,...,m}. (1)
Proof (of Lemma 1). Consider any of the rectangles inscribed under the graph of function f(x), with area
Ti := τi 
P
j≥i Dj. Then it holds that ΠUTP ≥ Ti for all i ∈ {1,...,m}, since the area of any such rectangle
is a lower bound for the revenue yielded by the optimal uniform tariﬀ ΠUTP. (Notice that this does not
hold for the general tariﬁcation problem.) Hence, if only r diﬀerent tariﬀs are utilized, we consider the r
(inclusion-)maximal rectangles under function f, say Ti1,...,Tir, and get r  ΠUTP ≥
Pr
j=1 Tij ≥ ΠRTP.
⊓ ⊔
Since r ≤ m, Lemma 1 yields the following theorem. Tightness of the result will be shown below,
using Example 1.
Theorem 2. Uniform tariﬁcation is an m–approximation for the river tariﬁcation problem.
We next derive an another bound on the quality of uniform tariﬁcation policies, developing further








































































































































































































































































































Fig.4. Staircase function f(x) with inscribed rectangle.
Theorem 3. Uniform tariﬁcation is a (1+lnD)–approximation for the river tariﬁcation problem, where
D ≤
Pn
k=1 dk is the total demand that is served by the operator in an optimal solution.
Proof. Indeed, we will even prove a slightly stronger result than claimed in Theorem 3. Consider an
optimal non-uniform tariﬁcation, and recall the deﬁnition of the corresponding staircase function f in (1),
as well as the inscribed rectangles, with areas Ti = τi  
P
j≥i Dj. Let ℓ be the index of the maximal area
rectangle among all Ti, with area Tℓ. Let xℓ :=
P
j≥ℓ Dj = Tℓ/τℓ. Moreover, denote by τmax the maximal









for x ∈ [0,D). (3)
We claim that g(x) ≥ f(x) for x ∈ [0,D). To see this, take any x with
P
j<i Dj ≤ x <
P
j≤i Dj, then















≥ τi = f(x),
where the ﬁrst inequality follows by choice of x, and the last follows by choice of ℓ as the index of the
largest rectangle.
Hence, the area under the staircase function, which equals ΠRTP, can be upper bounded in terms of
the area deﬁned by the function g(x), as depicted in Figure 5. To compute this area, we partition it into
three parts, namely the rectangle Tℓ itself, the area under g(x) on the domain x ∈ [0,D − xℓ], as well
as the area to the right of g(x) on the domain τ ∈ [τℓ,τmax]. The latter is the integral of the function
D − g−1(τ) = Tℓ/τ on the domain [τℓ,τmax]. We thus obtain the following.











= Tℓ[1 + lnD + lnτmax − lnτℓ − lnxℓ]
= Tℓ [1 + ln(Dτmax/Tℓ)] ,
and since Tℓ ≤ ΠUTP, claim (2) follows. ⊓ ⊔
Notice that claim (2) conﬁrms the following geometric intuition: The closer the staircase function











































































































































































































































































































Fig.5. Illustration for the proof of Theorem 3.
ratio of (1+ln4) ≈ 2.4 for uniform tariﬁcation. Geometric intuition indeed suggests a ratio of roughly 2,
the additional 0.4 being caused be the diﬀerence between the functions g(x) and f(x). In Section 5.3, we
compare the quality of uniform versus non-uniform tariﬁcation, based on instances obtained from France
T´ el´ ecom.
In the case of unit demands of the clients, that is, if dk = 1 for all clients k = 1,...,n, we obtain the
following.
Corollary 1. Whenever clients have unit demands, uniform tariﬁcation is a (1 + lnn)–approximation
for the river tariﬁcation problem.
Finally, let us show tightness of the bounds in Theorems 2 and 3.
Example 1. Given n=m clients and m tariﬀ arcs. Every client is operating her own subnetwork with one
tariﬀ arc, thus the entire network consists of m disjoint subnetworks and each of them contains one client
and one tariﬀ arc. Fix b > 1 and let the demand of client k in subnetwork k be given by dk = b
k − b
k−1,
k ∈ {1,...,m}. This way, the total demand equals b
m−1. Moreover, the maximal revenue for subnetwork
k is limited by a ﬁxed cost arc (sk,tk), with cost uk = b
2m−k. Hence, the maximal tariﬀ τmax equals
b
2m−1. See Figure 6 for an example with n = m = 4. ⊓ ⊔
0 0
2 2 t s
0 0
3 3 t s
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4 4 t s
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Fig.6. The analysis of uniform tariﬁcation policies is tight.
In the optimal solution, the tariﬀ for each subnetwork k is set to its maximal value, b
2m−k. Each subnet-
work therefore contributes a revenue of b
2m −b
2m−1, and ΠRTP = m(b
2m −b
2m−1). The optimal uniform
tariﬁcation consists in setting the tariﬀ on all tariﬀ arcs to b
m. This way, every unit of demand creates
a proﬁt of b
m, yielding a total revenue of b
2m − b
m. Other (reasonable) uniform tariﬀs would be valuesPricing Bridges to Cross a River 11
b
2m−k, k ∈ {1,...,m−1}. This yields a total revenue of b
2m −b





















Now, observe that in the optimal solution m diﬀerent tariﬀs are utilized. Lemma 1 (Theorem 2, respec-
tively) suggests that uniform tariﬁcation provides an m–approximation. Example 1 proves that this is
best possible, since b can be chosen arbitrarily large.
Moreover, Theorem 3 suggests that uniform tariﬁcation is a (1+lnD)–approximation. In Example 1,
we have D = (b
m − 1) and thus (1 + lnD) = 1 + ln(b
m − 1) ≤ 1 + mlnb. Hence, Theorem 3 yields that
uniform tariﬁcation is a O(m)–approximation on this example. The same Example 1 shows that O(m) is
indeed best possible. Summarized, we thus get the following.
Theorem 4. For uniform tariﬁcation, the performance bound of Theorem 2 is best possible, and the
performance bound of Theorem 3 is best possible up to a constant factor.
5.3 Numerical Results
As stated previously, whenever the function that describes the total revenue in an optimal non-uniform
solution, i.e.the staircase function deﬁned in (1), is close to a straight line, geometric intuition suggests
a worst-case ratio for uniform tariﬁcation of approximately 2. The worst case Example 1 crucially hinges
on a (staircase) function that approximates a hyperbola. Thus, it can be conjectured that the empirical
performance of uniform tariﬁcation policies outperforms the theoretical bounds we have found. This is
indeed conﬁrmed in the following numerical experiments, displayed in Table 1. The study is based on
instances obtained from France T´ el´ ecom.
Table 1. Quality of Uniform Tariﬁcation on France T´ el´ ecom instances.
Instance |N| |A| m n Π
RTP Π
UTP %
RTN1 29 94 7 15 841 624 74%
RTN2 29 98 6 21 4099 3496 85%
RTN3 59 206 10 13 1118 880 79%
RTN4 59 204 10 20 2217 1512 68%
RTN5 49 120 9 21 74948 55968 74%
RTN6 33 116 15 12 28166 20328 72%
These instances represent telecommunication networks for the international interconnections market,
as described in Section 4. We compare the optimal solutions for uniform tariﬀs ΠUTP and non-uniform
tariﬀs ΠRTP. The optimal non-uniform solution is calculated using the model and mixed integer pro-
gramming formulation described in Bouhtou et al. [3]. The value of ΠUTP is calculated using the same
formulation, requiring that all tariﬀs be equal. We do not compare the actual computation times here,
but are only interested in eﬀectiveness of the optimal uniform tariﬁcation policies. Table 1 gives a brief
description of each network, stating the number of nodes |N|, arcs |A|, tariﬀ arcs m, and clients n. The
optimal non-uniform and uniform solution values are displayed in the columns ΠRTP and ΠUTP. The
ﬁnal column is the approximation ratio.
5.4 Polynomially solvable special cases
Several polynomially solvable special cases of the (general) tariﬁcation problem are discussed by Labb´ e
et al. [11] and van Hoesel et al. [14]. Clearly, these results hold for the problem considered in this paper,
too. In addition, we have the following polynomially solvable cases for the river tariﬁcation problem.12 A. Grigoriev et al.
Theorem 5. If the number of clients n is bounded from above by a constant, the river tariﬁcation problem
is solvable in polynomial time.
Proof. If the number of clients n is bounded from above by a constant, the number of assignments of
clients to tariﬀ arcs is bounded by mn which is a polynomial for ﬁxed n. Consider an assignment of clients
to tariﬀ arcs and let the tariﬀ arc (if any) taken by a client k be denoted by ak. The following linear






s.t. τak + ckak ≤ τa + cka, ∀ k ∈ K,∀ a ∈ T,
τa ≥ 0, ∀ a ∈ T.
(4)
Solving mn instances of (4), we can retrieve the optimal solution in polynomial time. ⊓ ⊔
Finally, for speciﬁc cost structures of the network, the river tariﬁcation problem is polynomially
solvable, too. To this end, assume that the cost cka for connecting client k to tariﬀ arc a is only composed
of an individual cost per client ck, independent of the tariﬀ arc a, and of a shipment cost ca, independent
of the client k. In other words, we assume that there exist positive integers ck, k ∈ {1,...,n}, and ca,
a ∈ T, such that cka = ck + ca for every client k and tariﬀ arc a.
Theorem 6. Assuming the cost structure described above, the river tariﬁcation problem is solvable in
polynomial time.
Proof. Consider a feasible solution of the problem and let τa,a ∈ T, be the corresponding tariﬀs on the
tariﬀ arcs. Without loss of generality, we assume that in that solution client 1 utilizes a tariﬀ arc a1 at
price τ1 and client 2 utilizes a tariﬀ arc a2 at price τ2. Since in any feasible solution client 1 routes her
demand via the shortest path, we have that c1a1 + τ1 ≤ c2a2 + τ2. From the cost structure we derive
that c1 + ca1 + τ1 ≤ c1 + ca2 + τ2 and therefore ca1 + τ1 ≤ ca2 + τ2. Similarly, for client 2 we have that
ca1 + τ1 ≥ ca2 + τ2. Hence we obtain that ca1 + τ1 = ca2 + τ2, meaning that users 1 and 2 are indiﬀerent
between tariﬀ arcs 1 and 2. Thus we may assume without loss of generality that they both use the same
tariﬀ arc. Proceeding iteratively this way, we may assume that all clients use the same tariﬀ arc. For every
choice of the utilized tariﬀ arc we can now ﬁnd the maximum revenue associated with this arc (assuming
that the other tariﬀ arcs are so expensive that no client can aﬀord their utilization), using binary search
on the tariﬀ for that tariﬀ arc. Choosing the arc that provides the highest total revenue we obtain the
optimal solution for the problem. ⊓ ⊔
6 All-service river tariﬁcation problem
In this section, we consider the following variation of the river tariﬁcation problem. The operator must set
tariﬀs in order to capture the demand of all clients, that is, tariﬀs must be such that no client k is forced
to use the arc (sk,tk). We refer to this problem as the all-service river tariﬁcation problem. NP-hardness
of this problem follows by our previous reduction presented in Section 5.
It follows from trivial examples that the maximal revenue for the all-service problem can be an
arbitrary factor away from the maximal revenue without the all-service constraint. Hence, we have an
arbitrarily high ‘cost of regulation’. In addition, we can show that the maximal revenue for the all-service
problem cannot be approximated within any reasonable bound.
Theorem 7. For any ε > 0, the existence of a polynomial time approximation algorithm for the all-
service river tariﬁcation problem with with n clients and m tariﬀ arcs with worst case ratio O(m1−ε) or
O(n1/2−ε) implies ZPP = NP.Pricing Bridges to Cross a River 13
Proof. The proof uses an approximation preserving reduction from Independent Set [6] to the all-
service RTP. So assume we are given a graph G = (V,E), and the problem is to ﬁnd a maximum
cardinality subset V ′ ⊆ V of vertices such that no two vertices in V ′ are connected by an edge. The
transformation works as follows. For every vertex v ∈ V we introduce a client with origin-destination pair
{sv,tv} and demand dv = |E|, and a corresponding tariﬀ arc av. We connect the source sv to the tail of
the tariﬀ arc av, and the head of av to the destination tv, using zero cost ﬁxed cost arcs. Moreover, there
is a ﬁxed cost arc (sv,tv) with cost (|V | + 1) for all vertices v ∈ V . For every edge e ∈ E we introduce
a client with origin-destination pair {se,te} and unit demand. The upper bound on the cost of routing
this demand is given by the ﬁxed cost arc (se,te) with cost 1. For all edges e ∈ E and all vertices v ∈ V
with v ∈ e, we furthermore introduce ﬁxed cost arcs (se,tail(av)) and (head(av),te), with zero cost. This
transformation results in an instance of the all-service RTP with |V | tariﬀ arcs, and |V | + |E| clients.
Figure 7 gives an example of such a transformation for a graph G = (V,E) with 3 nodes and 2 edges.
We claim that G has an independent set of cardinality at least k if and only if there exists a tariﬀ
policy for the all-service RTP with a total revenue of |V ||E|(k + 1) + |E|.
First, assume that G has an independent set V ′ of cardinality k. For all v ∈ V ′, set the tariﬀ on the
corresponding tariﬀ arc av to |V | + 1, and all other tariﬀs to 1. By the deﬁnition of an independent set,
for any edge e = (v,u) ∈ E at least one of the vertices, v or u, is not in V ′. Therefore, the tariﬀ of at least
one of the tariﬀ arcs, av or au is 1. All clients corresponding to an edge e can thus be served, using one of
the tariﬀ arcs av or au. The clients (sv,tv) corresponding to the vertices v ∈ V are also served, since the
upper bound of |V | + 1 is not exceeded with the so-deﬁned tariﬀs. Hence, all demands are served. The
revenue consists of |E| from all clients corresponding to the edges E of G, |E|(|V | + 1)k from the clients
corresponding to the independent set V ′, and |E|(|V |−k) from the clients corresponding to V \V ′. That
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(b) All-service RTP.
Fig.7. Reduction of Independent Set to all-service RTP.
Conversely, assume that there exists a set of tariﬀs that captures all demands, such that the revenue is
|E||V |(k+1)+|E|. We will show that this implies that the graph G has an independent set of cardinality
at least k. Since all demands are captured at this tariﬁcation strategy, for any edge e = (v,u) ∈ E, the
tariﬀ on at least one of the arcs, av or au, is 1. Consider the set of vertices V ′ := {v ∈ V : tav > 1}. By
deﬁnition, no pair of nodes v,u ∈ V ′ is connected by an edge. Hence, V ′ is an independent set in G. Let
k′ := |V ′|. The revenue is equal to |E| + |E|(|V | − k′) + |E|(|V | + 1)k′ = |E||V |(k′ + 1) + |E|, which by
assumption is at least as large as |E||V |(k + 1) + |E|. This implies that k′ ≥ k and thus that V ′ is an
independent set in G of cardinality k′ ≥ k.14 A. Grigoriev et al.
Now, let us assume that we have an α-approximation algorithm A for the all-service RTP, with
α ≥ 1. Consider any instance G = (V,E) of Independent Set, and the all-service RTP resulting from
the above reduction. We can assume that both the optimal solution and the solution produced by A only
utilize tariﬀ values 1 or |V |+1, because any tariﬀ greater than 1 and not equal to |V |+1 can be turned
into |V |+1 with a revenue gain. So ΠRTP = |E||V |(k+1)+|E| for some k, and ΠA = |E||V |(k′+1)+|E|
for some k′. The ﬁrst part of the proof yields that the maximal independent set of G has size k, and




|E||V |(k′ + 1) + |E|
|E||V |(k + 1) + |E|
=
1 + 1
|V | + k′
1 + 1





hence k′ ≥ (k+1)/α−2. In other words, we have an O(α)–approximation algorithm for the Independent
Set problem.
It follows from H˚ astad [9] that the Independent Set problem cannot have a polynomial time ap-
proximation algorithm with worst case guarantee O(|V |1/2−ε) unless P = NP, and that it cannot have a
polynomial time approximation algorithm with worst case guarantee O(|V |1−ε) unless ZPP = NP. Since
the number of tariﬀ arcs m in our transformation equals |V |, the ﬁrst claim of the theorem follows. Since
the number of clients n in our transformation equals |V | + |E| ∈ O(|V |2), the second claim follows. ⊓ ⊔
Notice that this inapproximability result shows that we cannot even expect a performance guarantee
logarithmic in the total demand D, like the one we obtained before. On the positive side, however, we
can show the following.
Theorem 8. There exists an n-approximation algorithm for the all-service river tariﬁcation problem.
Proof. In an optimal solution, at least one client contributes to the total revenue at least ΠRTP/n, and
this contribution is achieved by utilizing a speciﬁc tariﬀ arc at a certain tariﬀ. The proof now works by
enumeration over all m n possibilities for a client using a speciﬁc arc. So assume that a tariﬀ arc b and
a client k are ﬁxed. We claim that we can compute the maximum tariﬀ τb on arc b, together with tariﬀs
on all the other arcs, such that client k indeed utilizes arc b, and all other clients are served. Taking
the maximum over all m n possibilities for a client using a speciﬁc arc, the revenue of this solution is
obviously at least ΠRTP/n.
The computation of this maximum tariﬀ τb on arc b, together with tariﬀs on all the other arcs, such
that client k indeed utilized arc b, and all other clients are served, can be achieved by binary search over
the possible tariﬀs τ on arc b. Denote by cka the ﬁxed cost for client k when utilizing arc a, and recall
that uk denotes the maximum total (per unit) cost aﬀordable for client k. Given that client k utilizes arc
b, the maximum tariﬀ on arc b is uk − ckb, which determines the interval for the binary search. Given
some tariﬀ τ on arc b, in order to make sure that client k utilizes arc b, we just deﬁne the tariﬀs on all
other tariﬀ arcs a as τa = τ + ckb − cka. It is straightforward to verify if this yields a feasible solution
with all clients served or not. ⊓ ⊔
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